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INTRODUCTION
Money laundering has traditionally been thought of as the
transformation of tainted money in order to make it appear to have come
from a legitimate source. One way to do this is to conceal or disguise
money in order to make it harder to trace the proceeds back to their illicit
origins.
Federal money laundering charges are controlled by the
companion statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957. It makes a difference what
section of the money laundering statute the government brings charges
under. There are a number of money laundering charges contained within
the statute including, among others, using the proceeds of unlawful activity
to promote further crime or knowingly participating in a transaction to
avoid a reporting requirement under state or federal law.1 Specifically,
concealment money laundering is described as transactions involving illicit
proceeds executed “to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the
source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity[.]”2 Evidence of concealment must be substantial.3 While it is not
necessary to prove intent to conceal in order to convict someone of money
laundering in general, it is necessary to prove intent to get a conviction for
concealment money laundering.4 Therefore, in order to bring a successful
concealment money laundering charge, prosecutors must show that (1) “the
property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity”5 and (2) the defendant knew that the transaction
was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, location,
source, ownership, or control of the unlawful proceeds.6 The terms design
and intent can be equated in this context because the statute makes clear
that a scheme must have been intended to conceal the proceeds or designed
in such a manner that concealment was the scheme’s intention.
1. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (B)(ii) (2014) (containing a list of charges
associated with money laundering).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2014).
3. United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 1999).
4. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (b)(1) (2014) (creating money laundering liability for
individuals knowingly transporting illegal proceeds).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2014).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2014).
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Concealment money laundering can be accomplished in a number of
ways. One common method of concealment money laundering is to place
the tainted funds in another person’s name. Indeed, courts have found that
“a design or intent to conceal the nature, the source, or the ownership of
unlawfully obtained proceeds may be inferred when a defendant transfers
those proceeds into the control of others with whom the defendant has a
very close relationship.”7 Intent to conceal can also be inferred from the
use of unlawful proceeds to buy assets in another person’s name.8 Some
courts have even found defendants guilty of money laundering when they
transferred funds between accounts in the defendants’ own names.9 This
interpretation is not unreasonable given that it is not necessary for a
defendant to completely remove all traces of his or her involvement in
order to satisfy the design or intent element.10 However, the judicial
circuits have applied divergent standards in determining what kinds of
transfers constitute concealment money laundering. While courts have no
problem agreeing over what constitutes the proceeds of an unlawful
activity, the circuits have split as to what types of acts permit an inference
of intent to conceal.
In some circuits, the act of putting unlawful proceeds in a third party’s
name on its own is sufficient to demonstrate intent to conceal. For
example, the Tenth Circuit has reasoned that:
[W]hile a showing of simply spending money in one’s own name
will generally not support a money laundering conviction, using a
third party, for example, a business entity or a relative, to
purchase goods on one’s behalf or from which one will benefit
usually constitutes sufficient proof of a design to conceal.11
Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit seems more interested in whether the
funds were actually more concealed as a result of the transfer:
[A] money laundering concealment conviction . . . requires
evidence of something more than a simple transfer of funds
between two accounts, each bearing the parties’ correct name.
7. United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 2000). See also United
States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1387 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[A] transfer from one third party to
another supports a reasonable inference of a design to conceal because it moves the money
further away from the defendant than it was before the transfer.”).
8. United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 1998).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Norman, 143 F.3d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that
the defendant could be found guilty of money laundering even though he used his own name
and made no effort to conceal his identity in the transactions forming the basis of the money
laundering charges).
10. Willey, 57 F.3d at 1386.
11. Willey, 57 F.3d at 1384–85 (describing the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in United States
v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994)).

ARTICLE 6 (WANG) (DO NOT DELETE)

258

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/7/16 3:02 PM

[Vol. 18:1]

There must be some evidence that the funds are more concealed
after the transaction is completed than before. Decisions by our
sister circuits also support this conclusion.12
It is important to note that 18 U.S.C. § 1956 is a money laundering
statute and not a money spending statute. Merely spending unlawful
proceeds does not automatically provide a basis for a money laundering
conviction. “[I]t is the concealing or disguising of the funds and not their
spending that is prohibited by” § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).13 Furthermore, putting
funds or buying assets in another’s name is also not illegal on its own; but
when considered alongside other legal but suspicious activities, it can give
rise to an inference of money laundering.14
This Paper analyzes the current circuit split on what constitutes
concealment money laundering. Specifically, it considers whether the
Supreme Court’s novel money laundering decision in Regalado Cuellar v.
United States, which set a more stringent standard for what is sufficient for
an intent to conceal, has altered this split at all.15 Part I of this Paper will
give a brief overview of the legislative history of the money laundering
statutes. Part II explores the circuit split regarding the standard of proof
necessary to convict someone of concealment laundering and the different
grounds upon which defendants had been convicted before the Cuellar
decision. Part III describes the case Regalado Cuellar v. United States and
its impact on how courts must now conduct their analysis in concealment
money laundering cases. Part IV looks at cases that were decided after
Cuellar and how courts’ approaches have and also have not changed.
Finally, Part V recommends that (1) courts should continue to look at the
traditional indicators of concealment as a starting point, (2) circumstantial
evidence ought to be allowed to show inferred intent but it must be paired
with “objective” evidence as well, and (3) courts need to more strictly
follow Cuellar, despite the holding’s issues, in order to maintain
consistency in concealment money laundering case law and to adhere to the
primary purpose of the statute.

12. United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006).
13. MARVIN G. PICKHOLZ ET AL., Types of Violations, 21 SECURITIES CRIMES § 6:19
(Database updated November 2014). See also Money Laundering, EXEC. LEGAL SUMMARY
53 (Database updated June 2015) (“An intent to conceal is commonly found where the
defendant uses a false name or shell corporation to hide his or her identity. This
requirement may also be met where third parties are involved to conceal the funds.
However, the buying of personal goods alone does not show an intent to conceal.”).
14. Rachel Ratliff, Third-Party Money Laundering: Problems of Proof and
Prosecutorial Discretion, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 178 (1996).
15. Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008).
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Money laundering was not always controlled by a primary federal
statute. Prior to the statutes eventually codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956,
1957, the federal government relied on a combination of Title 31 currency
transaction reporting statutes, Title 21 conspiracy provisions, and Title 18
conspiracy statutes to prosecute money laundering activities.16 The money
laundering legislation developed from a combination of changes in
conspiracy law and forfeiture law, as well as the challenges facing
authorities in enforcing the currency transaction reporting requirements of
the Bank Secrecy Act.17
From a historical perspective, the money laundering statutes were also
a response to the pressing social issues of the time. Urbanization in the
1980s and 1990s fueled drug trafficking.18 The huge profits generated by
drug cartels and the increase of schemes to circumvent currency reporting
laws led President Reagan to form the “President’s Commission on
Organized Crime” through Executive Order 12,435.19 The purpose of the
Commission was to investigate organized crime.20
Part of its
responsibilities were to “evaluate Federal laws pertinent to the effort to
combat organized crime,” and to make recommendations to improve law
enforcement efforts.21 The Commission concluded that “money laundering
is the lifeblood of organized crime”22 and “[w]ithout the means to launder
money . . . organized crime could not flourish as it now does.”23 At the
time, the primary means of detecting money launderers was through the
Bank Secrecy Act, which imposes reporting requirements on financial
16. Daniel L. Snedigar, Loose Change: The Seventh Circuit Misses an Opportunity to
Clarify Money Laundering in United States v. Haddad, 2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 605, 607
(2007).
17. G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the ‘90’s, 27 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 149, 150 (1989).
18. Daniel H. Cicchini, Note, From Urbanization to Globalization: Using the Federal
Money Laundering and Civil Asset Forfeiture Statutes in the Twenty-First Century Drug
War, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 741, 745 (2010).
19. See Exec. Order No. 12,435, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,723 (Aug. 1, 1983) (establishing a
commission to examine organized crime).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Cover letter to PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH
CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING,
(1984), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/166517NCJRS.pdf (last visited Nov.
24, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/7TW2-PS8Y.
23. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED
CRIME,
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS,
AND
MONEY
LAUNDERING,
3
(1984),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/166517NCJRS.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2015),
archived at https://perma.cc/7TW2-PS8Y.
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institutions for transactions above a threshold amount.24 The Commission
made a number of recommendations regarding amendments to the Bank
Secrecy Act in order to tighten the restrictions on money launderers.25
However, it recognized that these recommendations did not directly target
money laundering activities.26 The Bank Secrecy Act only allowed law
enforcement to penalize money launderers indirectly by punishing those
who willfully violated the Act in the course of laundering their illicit
funds.27 However, money launderers who complied with the recordkeeping
and recording requirements of the Act, which they often did, could not be
touched unless the government could show that they also violated another
federal statute.28 Therefore, the Commission opined that the federal
government must strike directly at the heart of the problem by
criminalizing the use of financial institutions by money launderers.29 The
Commission even prepared draft legislation in their report,30 and “[i]n
response to the commission’s findings, Congress passed the Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986, . . . which was codified in 18 U.S.C. §§
1956, 1957.”31
Two related reports from the Senate and House of Representatives
provide valuable insight into the purpose of the money laundering statute.32
The legislative history makes it clear that the statute was designed to create
a new federal crime rather than to further penalize the underlying criminal
conduct.33 However, not all aspects of the original proposal were
incorporated into the final statute. For example, the House Report
suggested that the Money Laundering Control Act would penalize engaging
in a financial transaction using criminally derived property, thereby
encompassing virtually all activity involving illicit funds.34 However, in
1988, then-Senator Joe Biden emphasized that the purpose of this
amendment was to enhance the ability of law enforcement officers “to
obtain evidence necessary to convict money launderers,”35 not just money
spenders. Thus, what had originally developed as a method to hinder
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 59-61.
26. Id. at 61.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 62.
30. See id. at 65-82 (containing the draft legislation).
31. Snedigar, supra note 16, at 607.
32. See generally S. REP. NO. 99-433 (1986); H.R. REP. NO. 99-855 (1986) (discussing
Congressional intent in the enactment of the money laundering statute).
33. See S. REP. NO. 99-433, at 1-2; H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, at 7 (creating the new
Federal crime of money laundering).
34. H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, at 13.
35. 134 CONG. REC. S17, at 365 (1988) (emphasis added).
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organized crime became a targeted money laundering statute that is still in
effect today.
II.

CIRCUIT SPLIT PRE-CUELLAR

An individual can put money in another’s name in a number of ways
including depositing money into a bank account that bears someone else’s
name, conducting transactions in another person’s name, or buying
property and placing the title in the name of someone other than the buyer.
All of the circuits agree that putting money or assets into a third party’s
name is indicative of money laundering. What differs among the circuits is
whether that act alone is sufficient to convict a defendant of concealment
money laundering or if they need to consider additional facts before
conviction.
A number of circuits have found that simply putting unlawful
proceeds into a third party’s name is sufficient indication of intent to
conceal. In United States v. Wilkinson, the defendants transferred
fraudulently obtained funds to their other businesses, causing the primary
business to record the transfers on its books using false names for the
companies.36 This transaction could be characterized as an attempt to
conceal ownership. The Fourth Circuit held that doctoring the books with
the false names and submitting reports to another company using those
names was sufficient to sustain the money laundering charge.37
Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit seems to require more than the simple
transfer of unlawful assets into another person’s name in order to sustain a
concealment money laundering conviction. For example, transferring
money from one account in an individual’s name to another account in the
same individual’s name is insufficient to support an inference that the
particular transaction was intended to conceal.38 This contrast with the
Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Wilkinson is not that surprising since
transferring money into an account in one’s own name does not conceal
ownership. Still, the Fifth Circuit acknowledges that the use of third
persons is usually sufficient to demonstrate intent to conceal.39 For
example, it found intent to conceal in United States v. Powers, in which it
held that depositing checks into a third-party corporation’s bank account

36. United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214, 222-23 (4th Cir. 1998).
37. Id.
38. See United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1388 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that
evidence was insufficient to find that debtor committed offense of money laundering with
respect to check issued to debtor’s girlfriend from her brokerage account and deposited by
her into one of her personal checking accounts).
39. United States v. Pipkin, 114 F.3d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1997).
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was sufficient to demonstrate intent to conceal.40
The Tenth Circuit provided the following list of some of the types of
conduct that can support a jury finding a defendant engaged in transactional
money laundering:
[S]tatements by a defendant probative of intent to conceal;
unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction; structuring the
transaction in a way to avoid attention; depositing illegal profits
in the bank account of a legitimate business; highly irregular
features of the transaction; using third parties to conceal the real
owner; a series of unusual financial moves cumulating in the
transaction; or expert testimony on practices of criminals.41
However, while these activities may support a conclusion of guilt, they are
not necessarily sufficient to convict a defendant on their own. Many
money laundering cases require factual analysis and judges decide them on
a case-by-case basis. The differing facts among cases are perhaps the main
reason that the circuits have struggled to agree on a single standard.
A. Circuits Agree That the Money Laundering Statute Is Not a
Spending Statute
One area where the courts have agreed is the purpose of the statute.
The money laundering statute is a statute meant to punish money
laundering and nothing more. While the statute is admittedly broad, there
is widespread agreement among the circuits that it does not criminalize the
mere act of spending illicit proceeds.42
The Sixth Circuit in particular has emphasized that the money
laundering statute is not a spending statute. The buying of personal goods
with unlawful proceeds alone does not show intent to conceal. For
example, in United States v. Marshall, the defendant stole money from an
ATM, which he then used to purchase a Rolex watch, a diamond tennis
bracelet, and wine.43 The court found that the government could not infer
intent to disguise the money in violation of section 1956.44 It stated that
“Congress did not intend for this law to be treated as a ‘money spending
40. United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 754 (5th Cir. 1999).
41. United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1994)
(emphasis added).
42. See Matthew R. Auten, Note and Comment, Money Spending or Money
Laundering: The Fine Line Between Legal and Illegal Financial Transactions, 33 PACE L.
REV. 1231, 1232 (2013) (exploring courts’ approaches to differentiating money laundering
from money spending).
43. United States v. Marshall, 248 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
925 (2001).
44. Id. at 539-40.
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statute,’” and “the government must produce more evidence than the
simple fact of a retail purchase using illegally obtained money in order to
prove the ‘intent to disguise’ element of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).”45 Therefore,
showing that a defendant spent illicit funds is not a feasible path for
prosecutors in money laundering cases.
B. Factors in Determining Intent to Conceal
While money laundering cases tend to be particularly fact-specific,
there are certain types of transactions that courts consistently believe imply
an intention to conceal. These include unusual financial transactions and
transactions indicating a subjective intent to conceal by the defendant.
Conversely, some circuits are hesitant to find intent in cases where there is
a dearth of evidence in the record indicating that a defendant’s actions were
designed to conceal. For example, courts will typically infer that open and
conspicuous transactions indicate that defendants were not trying to
conceal the funds as much they were merely spending their illegally
obtained funds.
1. Unusual Financial Transactions
A highly unusual financial transaction can support a reasonable
inference of design to conceal.46 The Eleventh Circuit set out several
factors that are helpful in determining whether a transaction was designed
to conceal including, among others, statements by a defendant probative of
intent to conceal, unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction, highly
irregular features of the transaction, and a series of unusual financial moves
cumulating in the transaction.47 In United States v. Magluta, a drug dealer
paid his attorney fees with a check from an Israeli bank account under a
fictitious name.48 His associates transferred cash between themselves, then
transported the money from Miami to New York, and ultimately moved the

45. Id. at 538.
46. See United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1387 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding enough
evidence in a transaction where defendant’s girlfriend deposited a check issued by the trust
into a personal checking account in her name, thereby allowing defendant to get the money
out of his girlfriend’s brokerage account without creating any record of his involvement in
the transaction). See also United States v. Clements, 73 F.3d 1330, 1340 (5th Cir. 1996)
(defendant repeatedly converted received funds into multiple cashier’s checks made out to
himself, which he then deposited into his wife’s separate bank account thereby “obscur[ing]
the link between the money and . . . himself” and “undeniably made it more difficult for the
IRS to detect his evasion”).
47. United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1213 n.18 (11th Cir. 1999)
48. United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005)
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funds to the Israeli bank from which the defendant wrote the check to pay
his attorney.49 The use of so many intermediate steps implied a design to
conceal the source of the funds.50 The court found that the cash transfers,
the movement of the cash from Miami to New York to Israel, and the use
of a foreign account held in a false name were “a series of unusual financial
moves” which culminated in the defendant writing the checks.51 Therefore,
there was an air of “unusual secrecy surround[ing] the transaction[s]” and
the defendant’s use of his associates and the fictitious name demonstrated
his use of “third parties to conceal the real owner” of the money in the
foreign account.52 The final transaction with the defendant writing checks
on a foreign account held in a false name was itself also “highly
irregular.”53 The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed the defendant’s
convictions on the substantive money laundering counts since he used such
an elaborate plan to conceal the fact that he was using drug proceeds to pay
his attorneys.54
The fact that unusual financial transactions can be used as evidence of
concealment laundering is consistent with the idea that courts care about
the subjective intent of the money launderer. Using complicated financial
transactions to disguise money shows that a defendant took affirmative
steps to make it harder to trace the funds, which provides an even stronger
indication of a purpose to conceal.
2. Open and Conspicuous Transactions
Courts have typically found that situations where defendants used the
products that they purchased with their unlawful proceeds in an open and
conspicuous manner do not satisfy the “intent to conceal” element. The
rationale behind these decisions appears to be a practical one in that if a
defendant flaunted his or her ill-gotten gains in such an obvious manner,
then he or she must not have had an intent to conceal them. Of course, this
is all moot if there is evidence in the record of a clear intent to conceal
despite using their purchases openly and obviously. This also goes back to
the point that section 1956 is not a money spending statute: without an
intent or design to conceal, a defendant is only guilty of purchasing goods
with illicit funds, which is not chargeable under this statute.

49. Id.
50. See id. at 1177 (“Magluta went to great pains to conceal the fact that he was using
drug proceeds to pay his lawyers.”).
51. Id. at 1176-77 (quoting Majors, 196 F.3d at 1213).
52. Id. (quoting Majors, 196 F.3d at 1213).
53. Id. (quoting Majors, 196 F.3d at 1213).
54. Id. at 1177.
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The Tenth Circuit held in United States v. Sanders that the defendant’s
purchase of a car with the title in his daughter’s name was insufficient to
support his money laundering convictions.55 The government contended
that this transaction was designed to conceal or disguise proceeds from the
sale of drugs, thereby concealing the source of the funds.56 Factors that the
court considered included the fact that the daughter was present in the car
lot at the time of the purchase, the daughter shared the defendant’s last
name, and the defendant and his wife used the car conspicuously.57 The
court believed that all of these factors “undermine[d] the government’s
argument . . . that the . . . purchase involved the requisite design of
concealment.”58 The Tenth Circuit maintained this position in United
States v. Lovett.59 In that case, the purchase of a car and ring with
unlawfully obtained funds from the defendant’s grandmother’s bank
accounts was insufficient to support the money laundering charges.60
When the defendant purchased the car, he made statements to the car dealer
about “how he had done really well in the siding business.”61 The court
said that there was no indication that the defendant made statements in an
effort to justify or explain his ability to purchase the car with cash.62 The
statements were insufficient evidence to show an intent to conceal and in
the absence of any evidence of concealment, the “defendant’s open and
conspicuous manner of purchasing the [vehicle] undermines any inference
of concealment or disguise.”63 The court applied the same reasoning to the
purchase of the ring, finding that the inference of concealment from the
unusual manner of payment was usurped by the defendant’s open and
conspicuous purchase,64 thereby solidifying the point that purchasing items
alone cannot sustain a money laundering conviction since it is not a money
spending statute.
However, this defendant-friendly assumption may be negated by
concrete evidence of intent to conceal. For example, United States v.
Garcia-Emanuel involved the purchase of a pickup truck and a horse trailer
in the defendant’s wife’s name, among other goods.65 Despite finding that
the purchase of certain horses, a different horse trailer, a covered riding
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 945-46.
Id. at 946.
Id.
United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1036-37 (10th Cir. 1992).
Id.
Id. at 1036.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1037.
United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1478 (10th Cir. 1994).
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area, and round pen were insufficient to demonstrate a design to conceal,
the Tenth Circuit in the same opinion deemed this particular transaction as
probative of an intent to conceal because a witness testified that the
defendant put those assets in his wife’s name in order to deceive the IRS.66
Of course, the reliability of the witness may come into question. Still,
Garcia-Emanuel recognized that the purchase of goods in a third party’s
name alone was insufficient to convict someone for concealment money
laundering in the Tenth Circuit without more reliable evidence of intent.
Without this design to conceal, the government would have nothing
because, once again, section 1956 is not a money spending statute.
The Fifth Circuit had a similar holding in United States v. Dobbs.67 In
Dobbs, the defendant was a cattle rancher who had been charged with
money laundering for depositing illegal cattle sale proceeds in his wife’s
bank account used to pay ordinary household and ranch expenses.68 The
court found that this typical and straightforward banking transaction failed
to demonstrate intent to conceal the origin of the money.69 Transactions
that were “open and notorious” and involved no third parties to make
purchases or hide defendant’s activity did not constitute money
laundering.70
3. Subjective Intent of the Money Launderer
Some circuits looked at the knowledge and intent of the money
launderer, as opposed to objectively looking at the defendants’ acts, and
therefore seemed to already be following the line of reasoning later
solidified by Cuellar.
The Eighth Circuit has focused on the defendant’s knowledge that
transferring the funds to a third party would result in concealing the money
or making it more difficult to trace. For example, in United States v.
Norman, the defendant bought a Range Rover in his business’s name.71
The defendant contended that he could not be found guilty of money
laundering because he used his own name and made no effort to conceal his
identity in the transaction that was the basis for the money laundering
charges.72 The court rejected these claims and asserted that the point was
not whether the car seller was deceived as to who the defendant was but

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1478.
United States v. Dobbs, 63 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 397-98.
Id. at 397.
Id.
United States v. Norman, 143 F.3d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 376.
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rather that by changing the proceeds of an unlawful activity from a bank
account into the form of an automobile, the defendant “made it more
difficult for the true owner of the money to trace what had happened to
it.”73 Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a money laundering conviction in a
case where everything was in the defendant’s name yet there was still
inferable intent to conceal. It has made clear that “[i]t is the transformation
of unlawfully gained cash into another form . . . that evinces the design to
conceal.”74 For example, the use of drug proceeds to purchase stock in the
name of a third party would meet the concealing test.75 This reasoning has
its issues. The “transformation of unlawfully gained cash into another
form” seems like another way of saying buying things with illicit proceeds.
However, both case law and the statute’s legislative history have
emphasized that the money laundering statute is not a money spending
statute. Unfortunately, the Eighth Circuit did not address this issue in its
reasoning.
In United States v. Heaps, the defendant was a drug dealer who
instructed that payment be wire transferred to his wife.76 The wife testified
at trial that she picked up the money at the direction of the defendant,
cashed the money orders, and brought the money to the apartment that she
shared with the defendant where she then put the cash in a money box.77
The government argued that the defendant instructed the money be
transferred to his wife rather than to himself in order to conceal and
disguise the source and ownership of the funds from law enforcement
authorities.78 The only witness who testified to the purpose of the
arrangement was the wife, who asserted that the only reason that she picked
up the money was because the defendant was away and would not be able
to go himself.79 The defense also pointed to a taped conversation in
evidence in which the defendant told his co-conspirators that they did not
need to send the money to his wife again.80 The defense argued that since
the defendant was available at the time of the second wiring, there was no
reason to have the money sent to his wife.81 The Fourth Circuit was
convinced by this reasoning and held that the fact that the money was wired
73. Id. at 377.
74. United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 2000).
75. United States v. Martin, 933 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1991).
76. United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479, 481 (4th Cir. 1994). At the time of the
transactions, the woman was the defendant’s girlfriend, but at the time of trial, she was his
wife.
77. Id. at 482.
78. Id. at 487.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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to the defendant’s wife instead of to the defendant was not enough to show
concealment because the record showed that it was for the purpose of
convenience and not concealment.82 This interpretation may be a bit
generous, but it demonstrates how courts are concerned about the intent to
conceal and not just activities that may have an effect of concealing. This
type of reasoning is reminiscent of what the Supreme Court later held in
Cuellar, which indicates that focusing on an alleged money launderer’s
subjective purpose is not a novel notion.
C. Specific Examples of Acts Transferring to Third Party
Multiple circuits agree that employing a third party to conceal the
defendant’s identity is one of the most obvious kinds of evidence that
would sustain intent to conceal.83 Two specific ways that this is
accomplished is by placing funds in a relative’s name or by purchasing cars
and writing someone else’s name in the car titles.
1. Placing Funds In A Relative’s Name
Incidents where an individual places illegally obtained funds or assets
in a relative’s name may be probative of intent to conceal due to the close
relationship that the defendant shares with the third party. By placing illicit
proceeds in a relative’s possession, the defendant could still theoretically
regain access at a later date relatively easily. In contrast, if a defendant
puts money into a bank account in a person’s name with whom he or she
has no legal relationship, the chances of those funds making their way back
to the defendant would appear to diminish because that third party would
need to grant the defendant access.
The First, Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have found depositing
unlawful proceeds in a relative’s name probative of intent to conceal or
disguise. In United States v. Hall, the defendant gave his sister $16,000 in
cash in order to purchase a money order in her name payable to a truck
dealer.84 The defendant then used the money order to purchase a dump
truck.85 The First Circuit reasoned that the defendant’s use of his sister’s
82. Id.
83. United States v. Marshall, 248 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
925 (2001). See also United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1034 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992)
(asserting the same proposition); United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1124-25 (6th Cir.
1996) (asserting the same proposition in a case where defendant caused third parties to wire
transfer drug proceeds to members of his family for his benefit, without defendant’s name
appearing on any records, thus concealing defendant’s ownership of the funds).
84. United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2006).
85. Id.
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name on the money order evidenced intent to conceal because it was an
“attempt[] to disguise the source of the proceeds by having it pass through
another person’s control.”86
The Second Circuit has taken a more literal approach to the text of the
statute and has still found that the use of a third party is a sufficient
indication of concealment money laundering: “[Section] 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i)
does not require an attempt to conceal the identity of the defendant; a
scheme that conceals only the source of the funds falls within the purview
of the statute.”87 Nonetheless, the court held that the concealment element
was satisfied in United States v. Stephenson, where the defendant’s wife
put the defendant’s illegal drug proceeds into a safe deposit box in her
name.88 The Second Circuit has also noted that transferring proceeds to an
account solely held by the defendant’s wife would be a circumstance that
might support an inference of deliberate concealment.89
The Fifth Circuit has reasoned that using a third party like a relative to
purchase goods on one’s behalf or from which one will benefit would
usually constitute adequate proof of a design to conceal.90 In United States
v. Short, the Fifth Circuit found sufficient evidence to satisfy the
concealment element when the defendant’s wife placed illegally obtained
money in a safe deposit box under another relative’s name.91 The Eighth
Circuit came to similar conclusions in United States v. Bowman.92 In
Bowman, the defendant deposited criminally derived funds into his
girlfriend’s account that she later used to buy personal items.93 The
defendant argued that he was simply financing his girlfriend’s checking
account but the court found that this type of behavior “evinces the design to
conceal.”94
The Tenth Circuit had not specifically addressed how the concealment
element applied when a defendant deposits unlawful proceeds into a family
member’s account prior to United States v. Shepard, in which the defendant
deposited checks that were made out to a third party and endorsed by the
third party and the defendant into his daughter’s bank account.95 The court
heavily considered other circuits’ approaches when conducting its analysis:
86. Id.
87. United States v. Kinzler, 55 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1995).
88. United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 1999).
89. United States v. Davidson, 175 F. App’x 399, 401 (2d Cir. 2006).
90. United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1385 (5th Cir. 1995) (describing the Tenth
Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994)).
91. United States v. Short, 181 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir. 1999).
92. United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 2000).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005).
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[I]n light of Garcia-Emanuel, other circuits’ treatment of illegal
deposits into a relative’s account, and our standard of review of a
jury verdict, we find sufficient evidence of concealment to
support Mr. Shepard’s conviction . . . . A rational jury could
reasonably conclude that Mr. Shepard intended to conceal or
disguise the unlawfully gained checks when he deposited them in
his daughter’s account.96
In United States v. Lovett, the Tenth Circuit also found that the
evidence was sufficient to support money laundering counts related to the
defendant’s purchase of a pickup truck for his brother and the purchase of a
house for himself and his wife.97 These goods were purchased with funds
that the defendant unlawfully withdrew from his grandmother’s account.98
The brother testified that the defendant specifically instructed him to not
tell their grandmother about the purchase of the pickup truck.99 The court
found that the purchase of the truck was designed to conceal the illegal
source of the proceeds from individuals who would likely expose the
defendant’s underlying fraudulent activities.100 By purchasing the truck,
the defendant “both disguised the nature of the [funds] . . . and also
prevented discovery of the fraudulent activities that generated the funds
ultimately used to purchase the [truck].”101 Therefore, the use of a
relative’s name has been accepted by multiple circuits as sufficient
evidence to prove a design to conceal.
2. Car Titling
Placing car titles in another’s name is an additional means that money
launderers have used to conceal unlawful proceeds. In United States v.
Antzoulatos, a car dealer sold numerous cars to alleged drug dealers, titling
them in other real and fictitious names or in the name of the car
dealership.102 One car was titled in the name of a customer’s one-year-old
nephew.103 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that “[t]he mistitling of cars is
relevant in this case only because of the number of incidents involved and
only then when viewed in conjunction with the other facts of this case.
There is certainly nothing illegal about buying a car and placing that car in

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1033-36 (10th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1031-32.
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1034.
Id.
United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d 720, 721-22 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 722.
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someone else’s name. . . .”104 Thus, although nominee titling, like
transferring money to a third party, is not illegal per se, in most cases it will
be taken as circumstantial evidence of concealment.105 In United States v.
Barnett, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the money laundering conviction of
an attorney who advised his client to title cars in the attorney’s name and
the client’s brother’s name.106 The Fourth Circuit also found intent to
conceal in an analogous case. In United States v. Adra, the defendant was
the manager of an automobile leasing business where he developed a
financing program catered toward high-credit-risk lessee clientele.107 The
transactions that led to the indictments in this case each involved a similar
fact pattern in which a young man came into the leasing company with an
older woman to apply for an automobile lease.108 In each case, the
defendant would direct the female companion to fill out the lease
application with her own income and credit information as the “nominee”
of the lease.109 However, the woman would not make any of the payments
nor be given possession of the car.110 Instead, the actual lessee would make
the payments and possess the car.111 It later came out that the actual lessee
in each of these transactions was engaged in drug trafficking.112 Thus, in
this specific situation, titling the car in another person’s name was a clear
indication of concealment.
The Eleventh Circuit has taken a similar view about putting a car title
in the name of someone other than the buyer. In United States v. GarciaJaimes, there was evidence that one of the defendants had instructed that a
car be put in his wife’s name in the course of a scheme involving the
transportation of illegal proceeds.113 The court found that the plan allowed
the owner of the money to place it in the hands of a third party, which
makes it difficult to determine both the owner and source of the money,
and concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that
the defendants had engaged in concealment money laundering.114
Therefore, putting a car title in another’s name is also accepted as a general
104. Id. at 727 n.4.
105. Ratliff, supra note 14, at 178.
106. United States v. Barnett, No. 91-3758, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28555, at *1 (7th
Cir. Aug. 18, 1993).
107. United States v. Adra, No. 93-5797, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 35200, at *1 (4th Cir.
Dec. 13, 1994).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. United States v. Garcia-Jaimes, 484 F.3d 1311, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007), overruled by
Moreno-Gonzalez v. United States, 533 U.S. 1091 (2008) (mem.).
114. Id.
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indication of concealment so long as there are also additional facts present
that support this conclusion.
III.

REGALADO CUELLAR V. UNITED STATES

The analysis in concealment money laundering changed in 2008 with
the decision in Cuellar v. United States. While some circuits had already
been focusing on whether the intent of the defendant was to conceal, other
circuits had been taking an objective approach and evaluating whether a
defendant’s actions made it more likely that funds could not be traced.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Cuellar, the standard has been set to
assess the subjective intent of the alleged money launderer.
In Cuellar, the defendant was stopped by a trooper while he was
driving in Texas to the Mexico border.115 Upon further inspection, the
trooper found a secret compartment under the car’s rear floorboard and
inside was $81,000 in cash wrapped in plastic bags.116 This case involved
the provision of the money laundering statute that prohibits international
transportation of the proceeds of unlawful activity.117 Cuellar was
convicted in the district court but his conviction was reversed at the Fifth
Circuit.118 The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision and
noted that “[b]ecause the Fifth Circuit used ‘design’ to refer not to the
purpose of the transportation but to the manner in which it was carried out,
its use of the term in this context was consistent with the alternate meaning
of ‘design’ as structure or arrangement.”119 In other words, how one moves
the money is distinct from why one moves the money.120 The Supreme
Court found that the secretive aspects of the transportation were employed
to facilitate the transportation, but not necessarily that secrecy was the
purpose of the transportation.121 By construing the facts in this way, the
Supreme Court equated the “design” element of section 1956 with purpose.
In order to convict the defendant, the government had to demonstrate that
he did more than merely hide the money during its transport.122 The
holding in Cuellar meant that “the inevitable effort to conceal every crime
from law enforcement d[id] not transform every financial transaction or
transportation involving criminally derived funds into money

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 553 (2008).
Id. at 554.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 554-55.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 553.
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laundering.”123
In their concurrence, Justices Alito and Kennedy argued that intent to
conceal can be inferred.124 They contended that the government could have
shown inferred intent if it had introduced evidence showing that (1) taking
money across the border had one of the effects of concealing the nature,
location, source, ownership, or control of funds and (2) it was commonly
known in the relevant circles that taking money across the border would
have one of these effects.125 This would have helped the inference that the
scheme was designed to conceal and the person carrying out the scheme
knew that this was the design. Here, while the government did introduce
evidence about the effects of carrying money across the border, it did not
point to any evidence in the record that would allow the fact finder to infer
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.126 Cuellar resolved a circuit split
by rejecting the requirement of an “attempt to create the appearance of
legitimate wealth” for money laundering.127 The question that remained
post-Cuellar was whether the “design to conceal” requirement had teeth.128
IV.

POST-CUELLAR

In light of its decision in Cuellar, the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded four cases on the same day.129 After, circuit courts have
generally followed the Supreme Court’s orders to focus on the why instead
of the how. The courts have required that the government prove more than
showing that a transaction had a concealing effect or that the transaction
was structured to conceal the nature of illicit funds.130
Instead,
“[c]oncealment – even deliberate concealment – as mere facilitation of
some other purpose, is not enough to convict. What is required, rather, is

123. Barry Boss et al., Money Laundering Defense After Santos and Regalado Cuellar,
CHAMPION, Sept. 2008, at 12, 12.
124. Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 569 (2008).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 570.
127. Samuel P. Schnider, The “Design to Conceal” Requirement and the Elusive
Culprits of Money-Laundering, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 2, 2 (2012).
128. Id.
129. The Supreme Court vacated Moreno-Gonzalez v. United States, 128 U.S. 2901
(2008) (mem.), rev’d 313 F. App’x 215 (11th Cir. 2008); Balderas v. United States, 128
U.S. 2901 (2008) (mem.), rev’d 237 F. App’x 921 (5th Cir. 2007); Nunez-Virraizabal v.
United States, 128 U.S. 2901 (2008) (mem.), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Garcia-Jaimes,
484 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2007); Ness v. United States, 128 U.S. 2900 (2008) (mem.), rev’d
466 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2006).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573, 586 (6th Cir. 2010)
(explaining that concealment must be the purpose of the transaction).
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that concealment be an animating purpose of the transaction.”131
A. Application of Concealment Standard After Cuellar
Cuellar does not appear to have resolved the varied liberality with
which the different circuits construed the standard for concealment money
laundering under section 1956. Courts often still rely on the traditional
indicators of money laundering. For example, in one case the Fifth Circuit
opined:
Here, the government relied on [the defendant]’s transfers of
funds from his operating accounts to investment accounts, and on
[defendant]’s purchases of property and investments – all done
openly, in his name – as proof of concealment money laundering.
. . . [Defendant] did not use false names, third parties, or any
particularly complicated financial maneuvers, which are usual
hallmarks of an intent to conceal. . . . We thus find that there is
insufficient evidence of concealment money laundering . . . .132
There have also been instances where it appears that the Cuellar
standard was not properly applied. For example, in United States v. Carter,
the defendant’s husband had underreported taxes, and the defendant had
signed those joint tax returns.133 During the course of their divorce
proceedings, the defendant acted under the advice of her lawyer and moved
$3,900,000 into previously existing accounts under only her name.134 As a
result of these actions, the defendant was later convicted of twenty-two
counts of money laundering, eighteen of which were under section 1956.135
During sentencing, the district court explained:
I believe that at some point [defendant] must have known her
husband was stealing money because their spending went from
one level to an entirely different level. . . . There is no indication
that she had anything to do with the fraud. It does, however,
seem to me that she must have been aware at some point that her
husband was doing something illegal because of the vast amount
of money that all of a sudden came into his hands . . . .136
This reasoning seems to indicate that the court believed the defendant
knew that the source of these funds was illegal, not that her actions were
designed to conceal the money from authorities rather than just her
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
United States v. Valdez, 726 F.3d 684, 690 (5th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Carter, 538 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 787.
Id. at 788-89.
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husband. Granted, Carter was decided only a couple of months after
Cuellar, but that does not change the fact that its holding appears to be
inconsistent.
Other circuits have remained more loyal to the Supreme Court’s
directive in Cuellar. The First Circuit applied Cuellar in its decision in
United States v. Cedeno-Perez.137 Here, the defendant was charged with
conspiracy to commit money laundering after delivering more than
$200,000 to an undercover agent posing as a money launderer.138 The court
distinguished this case from Cuellar because here, instead of transportation,
the underlying criminal conduct was a financial transaction.139 The
defendant engaged in conduct that was commonly known to conceal such
as employing code words, establishing meeting locations where there
would be no police, hiding bags of packaged money in his car, and making
deliveries in mall parking lots.140 The court felt that these actions had the
effects of hiding the money and rendering the transaction relatively
suspicious, which could lead a rational jury to have “reasoned that, since it
is commonly known that engaging in such conduct would have the effect of
concealing the location, source, ownership or control of the money being
transferred, it was [the defendant]’s purpose in so acting to conceal those
traits of the proceeds.”141 This analysis seems to coincide with Justices
Alito and Kennedy’s suggestion in their Cuellar concurrence opinion.
The Second Circuit distinguished United States v. Mercedes from
Cuellar by pointing out that the purpose of the attempted money
transaction in this case was to conceal the source of narcotics proceeds
rather than transporting cash.142 Nonetheless, the court still cited and
applied the rule established in Cuellar in affirming the defendant’s money
laundering convictions. During the plea colloquy in the district court, the
defendant was specifically asked, “[w]as the purpose to hide the fact that
[the money] was from narcotics?” to which the defendant replied, “I
believe so.”143 Based on Cuellar, the court found that this statement
substantiated that the purpose of the transaction was to conceal the source
of the narcotics proceeds and provided sufficient evidence that the
transaction violated the concealment clause of the money laundering
statute.144 Of course, not all defendants make it that easy for the court by
admitting a concealment purpose for their actions. While Cuellar has
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

United States v. Cedeno-Perez, 579 F.3d 54, 60 (1st Cir. 2009).
Id. at 55.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Mercedes, 283 F. App’x 862, 864 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id.
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changed the focus of courts, it has not prevented them from making
inferences as to defendants’ ultimate purposes or intents.
1. Intent to Conceal Can Be Inferred from Circumstantial Evidence
In the absence of an explicit admission of intent to conceal, courts
have still affirmed concealment money laundering convictions on the basis
of circumstantial evidence.145 In fact, according to the Fourth Circuit,
Cuellar made clear that a jury may infer the requisite design to conceal
based on circumstantial evidence.146
The Eighth Circuit has followed this approach. In United States v.
Delgado, the defendant gave his wife’s brother, Santa-Anna, cashier’s
checks and money orders to pay off the mortgage Santa-Anna owed on a
residence.147 The government also produced evidence that the brother had
signed over the residence to a company the defendant’s wife had formed
three days earlier.148 The court found that this supported an inference that
the defendant designed the transaction to disguise the illegal source and
nature of the funds that he used to finance the property transfer, which
sustained his money laundering conviction.149 Therefore, the standard that
has developed is whether a reasonable trier of fact could determine that a
defendant acted with the purpose of concealing rather than concealment
being a collateral consequence of the transaction.150
In United States v. Slagg, the Eighth Circuit concluded that there was
“ample circumstantial evidence” to allow a reasonable jury to infer that at
least some of the money gathered for the defendant’s $50,000 bail was drug
proceeds and the defendant was therefore guilty of conspiring to violate the
money laundering statute.151 In that case, the government presented
evidence of telephone conversations that the defendant had with his mother
and an unidentified man regarding his bail money.152 In those recordings,
the unidentified man described bringing the money to the courthouse as
145. See, e.g., United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d 470, 483 (1st Cir. 2005)
(“A conviction requires evidence of intent to disguise or conceal the transaction, whether
from direct evidence, like the defendant’s own statements, or from circumstantial evidence,
like the use of a third party to disguise the true owner, or unusual secrecy.” (emphasis
added)).
146. United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 724 (4th Cir. 2012).
147. United States v. Delgado, 653 F.3d 729, 738 (8th Cir. 2011).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 547 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming
defendant’s money laundering conviction because a reasonable finder of fact could
determine that defendant acted with an intent to conceal).
151. United States v. Slagg, 651 F.3d 832, 844 (8th Cir. 2011).
152. Id. at 838.
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“the one thing” impeding them from bailing the defendant out of jail and
that using the money as bail would “risk it ‘disappear[ing].’”153 The
defendant’s mother ultimately retained two bail bondsmen to deliver the
bail money to the courthouse.154 On appeal, the defendant argued that the
evidence was insufficient to prove that he knew that the bail-posting
transaction was “designed in whole or in part . . . to conceal or disguise” a
statutorily listed attribute of the money.155 The court applied Cuellar and
found that had the sole purpose of the agreement been to bail the defendant
out of jail, the transaction would not violate the money laundering statute
since it is not a “money spending statute.”156 However, from these
conversations, a jury could reasonably infer that the defendant knew his
colleagues planned to conduct the transaction in such a way as to “‘conceal
or disguise the nature, . . . the source, the ownership or the control’” of the
money and reduce the risk of the money’s “‘disappearing’” – in other
words, later being seized as drug proceeds.157
The Third Circuit used the same reasoning in United States v.
Young.158 In Young, a man named Myron Punter was a crack cocaine
dealer in Alaska who became concerned that he was casting suspicion upon
himself by sending a high volume of wire transfers and money orders in his
own name.159 The defendant was a childhood friend of Isiah Fawkes, who
was Punter’s cocaine source in the Virgin Islands. Fawkes instructed
Punter to send the money to the defendant and other individuals who would
then turn the money over to him.160 At trial, the jury heard evidence that
Fawkes provided Punter with names of individuals in the Virgin Islands to
whom the drug payments should be sent, including the defendant, in order
to “lessen suspicion.”161 The court concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that the defendant knew that
the money wire transactions in question were designed to conceal the true
“nature, location, source, ownership, or control” of the funds and affirmed
his money laundering conviction.162
It seems that so long as a reasonable jury could find or infer that a
defendant acted with the design to conceal the nature, location, source,
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
2011)).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 845 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i)).
Id. (quoting United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 1998)).
Id. at 846 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)).
United States v. Young, 532 F. App’x 259 (3d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 260.
Id. at 260-61.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 263-64 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 338 (3d Cir.
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ownership, or control of funds in the course of a financial transaction, those
cases would not contradict Cuellar, and the money laundering conviction
would stand. However, while this threshold does not seem like an
unbearably tough one to surpass, there are still a number of cases postCuellar where the government has not been able to meet this burden.
2. Cases that Failed the Cuellar Test
In United States v. Law, the defendants had been under investigation
by the FBI for drug trafficking.163 The government argued at trial that the
defendants conspired to launder the proceeds of their narcotics activities by
using those proceeds to pay a mortgage.164 However, the mortgage
payments provided the defendants with legitimate benefits, such as rental
income and a base for the drug operation.165 The D.C. Circuit found that
the defendants’ explanations for the mortgage payments created sufficient
reasonable doubt and no jury could conclude that that the purpose in paying
the mortgage was to conceal the source of illegally obtained funds.166 In
other words, a reasonable jury could not conclude that the “why” of
defendants’ actions was for the purpose of concealing.
The Third Circuit came to a similar conclusion in United States v.
Richardson.167 In Richardson, the defendant’s boyfriend was a drug dealer,
and she lied on a mortgage application regarding her income so that her
boyfriend’s name would not need to be included.168 The court found that
this did not satisfy the elements needed for concealment money laundering
because the defendant was not trying to hide the boyfriend’s involvement
but was simply trying to get a loan without his bad credit impacting it.169
Regardless of whether the case was decided correctly, Richardson
demonstrates how although a court or jury could imagine a scenario where
the defendant acted with the purpose of concealing, defendants can also
rebut this conclusion by giving a plausible alternative explanation for their
actions. Since the “why” of an action is so subjective, as long as the
justification that a defendant presents for why they did what they did is
reasonable, a court is likely to side with the defendant after Cuellar.
3. Examples of Cases that Were Reversed or Would Be Reversed

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 892 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 895.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 896.
United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 336.
Id. at 342.
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After Cuellar
Cuellar was a major decision that had significant ramifications in
money laundering case law. A few decisions that were either reversed by
Cuellar or would be decided differently had the Cuellar standard been in
effect are discussed below.
United States v. Ness is one of the cases that the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded in light of its decision in Cuellar.170 The defendant
in Ness had been convicted of one count of conspiring to commit money
laundering and one substantive money laundering count.171 The facts in
Ness were very similar to the situation in Cuellar. The defendant ran an
armored car carrier business that he used to receive millions of dollars in
narcotics proceeds from drug traffickers and then transport the money
abroad.172 The defendant avoided leaving a paper trail, hid the proceeds in
packages of jewelry, and used code words during his operation.173 The
Second Circuit reasoned that this evidence only showed “how” he moved
the money, but not “why.”174 Under Cuellar, such evidence was
insufficient to convict the defendant of concealment money laundering
because it only demonstrated an intent to conceal the transportation and not
that the transportation was designed to conceal.175 Therefore, as a result of
Cuellar, the Second Circuit overturned the convictions.
In Garcia-Jaimes, which was previously discussed in Part II, the
defendant put a car in his wife’s name that the court interpreted as an
attempt to make his illegal proceeds more difficult to trace.176 This
decision was vacated by Moreno-Gonzalez, which is one in the group of
cases that the Supreme Court reversed and remanded after Cuellar.177 The
Supreme Court did not explain its reasoning except for attributing the
decision to its recent Cuellar decision. The most probable explanation is
that the Eleventh Circuit looked at the objective effect of the act instead of
the defendant’s purpose. The court found that the defendants hiding the
money in cars was an attempt to conceal the money and the plan allowed
them to place the money in the hands of a third party, which made it
difficult to determine both the owner and source of the money, and as a
result, a jury could conclude that the defendants had engaged in
170. See supra note 129 (listing cases vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court in
light of Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008)).
171. United States v. Ness, 466 F.3d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2006).
172. United States v. Ness, 565 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2009).
173. Id. at 78.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. United States v. Garcia-Jaimes, 484 F.3d 1311, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007).
177. Moreno-Gonzalez v. United States, 128 U.S. 2901 (2008).
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concealment money laundering.178 There was no mention of whether the
design of the defendants’ actions was meant to conceal, and it therefore
failed the Cuellar standard.
There are also cases that were not explicitly overturned by Cuellar but
would most likely come out differently if they were decided today. For
example, in United States v. Johnson, the issue regarding concealment
money laundering was whether the defendant depositing illicit proceeds
into his mother’s account was for the purpose of concealing the origins of
that money.179 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the evidence was
insufficient to support the defendant’s money laundering convictions
because the government presented “no evidence of unusual secrecy,
questionable structuring, highly irregular features of the transfers, or
multiple movements of the same funds that assisted in concealing their
original source. Nothing about these transfers suggests that [the defendant]
attempted to avoid detection or attention.”180 However, once again, there
was no explanation of the “why” and the decision only focused on the
“how.” By only focusing on the transaction itself, the court gave basically
no weight to what the purpose of the transaction might have been.
Therefore, this case would have most likely come out the other way had it
been decided after Cuellar.
Two Eighth Circuit cases that were both discussed in Part II, United
States v. Norman and United States v. Bowman, would also have different
results post-Cuellar. In Norman, the court reasoned that the point was
whether the defendant made the funds more difficult to trace by using illicit
proceeds to purchase a car.181 However, Cuellar tells us that the point is
not whether an action actually makes funds more difficult to trace, but
whether that was the defendant’s purpose. The Norman decision remains
good law, yet the decision does not enlighten us as to what the “why” was.
Similarly, in Bowman, the defendant put illegal proceeds into his
girlfriend’s account, which she then used for personal expenses.182 The
court found that this transformation showed concealment.183 Once again,
without actually pointing to any evidence in the record, the court inferred
that the defendant’s actions were designed to conceal. These decisions
were problematic then and remain problematic now. First, they do not
satisfy the Cuellar standard. Second, both Norman and Bowman interpret
buying goods with illicit proceeds as money laundering when the statute

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Garcia-Jaimes, 484 F.3d at 1322 (11th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1291-92.
United States v. Norman, 143 F.3d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1998).
United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 2000).
Id.
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explicitly does not cover money spending. This issue is explored more in
depth in Part V, subsection 3.
There are, of course, many other cases that one could list to
demonstrate Cuellar’s impact. The primary takeaway is that Cuellar
significantly altered the standard against which concealment money
laundering cases are judged and would theoretically impact a great deal of
preceding case law.
B. What Has Remained the Same Post-Cuellar
1. Concealment Through Structuring
Showing that a defendant structured transactions is one way that the
government has successfully demonstrated concealment. After Cuellar,
there continues to be a trend of convicting individuals for concealment
money laundering because of their transaction structuring. There is no
monetary limit under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and a prosecutor could
theoretically charge a defendant for laundering even a penny under this
statute. Transaction structuring is controlled by the statute 31 U.S.C. §
5324, although there is a structuring provision in section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).
Financial institutions are required to report any transactions over $10,000,
and it is a criminal act to structure transactions, such as breaking up a
single transaction above the threshold amount into multiple transactions,
for the purpose of evading reporting requirements.184 Even though
structuring offenses could be charged through § 1956, courts have found
transaction structuring to be indicative of concealment and instead affirmed
convictions based on the concealment portion of the statute.
In United States v. Williams, the defendant was found guilty of a drug
conspiracy during which he structured transactions.185 The defendant
claimed that he structured his transactions in order to avoid reporting
requirements, not to launder money.186 The government argued that his
structuring was itself evidence of the defendant’s design to conceal.187 In
addition, the defendant used bank accounts in his own name and with
fictitious names to negotiate structured deposits in order to avoid law
enforcement attention regarding the nature and source of his funds.188 This

184. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a) (2014).
185. United States v. Williams, 605 F.3d 556, 560, 564 (8th Cir. 2010), rehearing and
rehearing en banc denied, No. 4:11-CV-02059-RWS, 2012 WL 6216790, at *8 (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 13, 2012).
186. Id. at 564.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 566.
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caused the Eighth Circuit to go into a detailed analysis and application of
other cases under the Cuellar standard since why the money was hidden
was more important than the mere fact that it was hidden.189
The Williams court first cited and discussed a Fifth Circuit case,
United States v. Brown, which discussed Cuellar in depth and applied the
Cuellar standard.190 In Brown, the defendants were pharmacists convicted
of a compilation of offenses, including money laundering arising from their
distribution of medication using false prescriptions.191 The government
proved concealment money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) by
demonstrating that some of the defendants made payments for illegal
prescription drugs in structured cash transactions.192 The Fifth Circuit held
that the government’s evidence was sufficient to satisfy the Cuellar
standard because the defendants “intended to and did make it more difficult
for the government to trace and demonstrate the nature of these funds.”193
The aspects of “classic” money laundering that were present included the
fact that the transactions were in cash so that they were not easily tracked
and that most of the deposits were below ten thousand dollars so as to
avoid triggering any reporting requirements that might lead to unwanted
attention regarding the details of the money.194 Importantly, the Fifth
Circuit noted that “[s]ome of this behavior could also be reached by the
‘structuring’ provisions of the money laundering statute, . . . but the
government charged concealment and has produced sufficient evidence to
support those charges.”195
The Williams court also found a Fourth Circuit case, United States v.
Villarini, to be instructive.196 In Villarini, the defendant embezzled
$83,000, which she thereafter deposited in structured amounts into a bank
account that she opened.197 The three deposits in question ranged in
amounts from $1,000 to $2,200.198 Like the defendant in Brown, the
defendant here argued that the Government had insufficient evidence to
sustain her money laundering conviction.199 While the court addressed that
the defendant could also have been charged through the structuring
provision under § 1056(a)(1)(B)(ii), it found that the fact the defendant
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 565.
United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 787 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 773, 775.
Id. at 787.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Williams, 605 F.3d 556, 565 (8th Cir. 2010).
United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530, 532 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id.
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made four transactions “at two-to-four-week intervals, gives rise to a
reasonable inference that the transactions were designed to avoid suspicion
or to give the appearance that she had a legitimate income stream.”200
Thus, following Brown and Villarini, the Eighth Circuit found that the
evidence in Williams was sufficient to prove concealment under the
Cuellar standard.201 It reasoned that:
Depositing money as cash with a fictitious name as the purchaser
does more than “merely hide” the money from reporting
requirements; we hold that a reasonable jury could find that [the
defendant]’s intent was to conceal the nature of the funds. If [the
defendant]’s only goal was to avoid reporting requirements, there
would be no need to use a fictitious name. The use of [a fake
name] demonstrates that [the defendant] wanted not only to
shield himself from reporting requirements but also to actively
conceal the nature or source of the funds.202
The use of fictitious names appears to have been what pushed the
Eighth Circuit over the edge regarding design to conceal. It distinguished
this case from its previous decision in United States v. Herron where the
defendants wired proceeds of a drug operation to their own bank accounts
using non-structured amounts.203 The defendants in Herron used their own
names when sending the money, and “there is no evidence to suggest that
the money was received by any persons other than those named in the . . .
records.”204 Therefore, there was no effort to conceal since the defendants
merely moved illegal proceeds from one place to another and were not
trying to disguise the source or ownership of the funds. This made the case
distinguishable from Williams because in Williams, the defendant took
affirmative steps toward concealing the nature and source of the funds by
adopting fictitious names.205 Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that
the defendant was not just “hiding” money but in fact designing the scheme
to disguise the source of the money.206
It should be noted that Villarini was decided in 2001, which was long
before Cuellar. Therefore, courts’ acceptance of transaction structuring as
a form of concealment money laundering is not a recent development.
However, it is one of the areas that has not seemed to be significantly
impacted by the Cuellar decision since courts will still readily accept

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 533.
Williams, 605 F.3d at 566.
Id.
United States v. Herron, 97 F.3d 234, 236-37 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 237.
Williams, 605 F.3d at 566-67.
Id. at 567.
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structuring as sufficient to demonstrate a purpose to conceal.
C. Implications for the Cuellar Standard
The Cuellar standard seems to be here to stay. In 2009, in response to
the financial crisis, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act
(FERA), which added additional crimes to the criminal code.207 Prior to the
statute’s passage, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL) anticipated that some members of the House Judiciary
Committee would introduce their own bills concerning fraud and money
laundering, so the NACDL put forth extensive and persistent efforts to
educate Capitol Hill on FERA’s problematic provisions.208 Various bills
were introduced regarding the various topics covered by FERA including
Representative Lungren’s Money Laundering Correction Act of 2009,
which actually went against the NACDL’s interests.209 This act sought to
legislatively reverse United States v. Santos and Cuellar.210 If passed, the
act would have amended the federal criminal code to allow a conviction for
money laundering based on merely concealing or disguising monetary
instruments and would have expanded the concept of monetary proceeds to
include gross receipts.211 The final bill was signed into law on May 20,
2009 and did not contain a legislative reversal of Cuellar but did
legislatively reverse Santos.212 As a result, Cuellar remains good law and
the standard dictated in that case will continue to be followed by the courts
for the foreseeable future.
D. The Application of Cuellar Remains Unclear
A number of recently decided cases highlight the inconsistencies in
applying the Cuellar standard among various courts.
In United States v. Rey, the Third Circuit appeared to have reverted

207. The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat.
1617.
208. Tiffany M. Joslyn, FERA’s Silver Lining – An Account of NACDL’s Efforts
Combating Overcriminalization, 33 CHAMPION 55 (2009).
209. H.R. 1793, 111th Cong. (2009).
210. Id. See also United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (holding that
“proceeds” of criminal activities applies only to criminal profits and not gross receipts);
Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 568 (2008) (holding that in order to sustain a
concealment money laundering conviction, the government must show that a defendant
intended to conceal illegal proceeds and the concealment was not merely the logical result
of a defendant’s actions).
211. H.R. 1793, 111th Cong. (2009).
212. Joslyn, supra note 208, at 56.
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back to the pre-Cuellar ways and allowed courts to draw even stronger
conclusions regarding intent from relatively ambiguous evidence.213 The
defendant in Rey was the CEO of a company who swindled individuals into
investing in her company by telling them that the company traded in
currencies, commodities, and precious stones.214 She also told them that
their funds were guaranteed, that they would never leave the firm’s bank
account, and that they would receive their principal back no matter what.215
In reality, the defendant transferred funds from the company’s bank
accounts to several other bank accounts for her own purposes.216 The
government offered evidence that the defendant transferred investors’
funds to the Hong Kong bank accounts in the name of corporations that had
no apparent ties to the defendant’s company.217 The money was never
invested but either spent or transferred back to individuals in the United
States, thereby concealing the location of the funds.218 The Third Circuit
reasoned that a jury could infer that the defendant wanted it to be difficult
for investors to discover the Hong Kong corporations and could also infer
that the defendant wired the funds for purposes of concealing the money
before it was spent or re-routed back to the defendant and her coconspirators in the United States.219 Given this evidence, the court found
that “there was ample evidence to support [the defendant]’s conviction for
international money laundering.”220 The Third Circuit thus appears to
support a standard that enables courts to make inferences much like they
did before Cuellar and deviate from the announced test.
The First Circuit displayed a similar level of generosity in United
States v. Ledee.221 In Ledee, a brother and sister were charged with
multiple bankruptcy-related crimes allegedly designed to conceal the
brother’s assets in order to avoid his obligations to creditors.222 The brother
transferred property to the name of a corporation which he also owned.223
He did not disclose this transaction when he filed for bankruptcy and also
lied to creditors about the property’s ownership.224 The illegal transaction
itself involved converting payments into eight cashier’s checks that were

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

United States v. Rey, 595 F. App’x 152, 153 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 156.
Id.
United States v. Ledee, 772 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2014).
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 25-26.
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payable to four individuals who had no financial interest in the transaction
or the corporation.225 On appeal, the defendants asserted that the
government failed to show that the money was derived from unlawful
activity and that they intended to conceal the money.226 The First Circuit
concluded that “[t]his claim warrants little discussion” since the evidence
supported a finding that the defendant initiated a “sham sale . . . and
arranged the convoluted handling of the proceeds, to further his earlier
fraudulent transfer and concealment of the property.”227 This is the only
explanation that the court provides. While the evidence is undoubtedly
suspicious, given that the Cuellar standard is so restrictive, it seems rather
casual for the court to state one of the major issues on appeal warrants
limited discussion. By simply stating that the evidence is sufficient, the
First Circuit gives no guidance on how to interpret future cases.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Courts have always cared about the intent of the defendant. Indeed,
the money laundering statute itself requires that the defendant know that
the transaction is designed in whole or in part “to conceal or disguise the
nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity[.]”228 However, under the Cuellar
standard, the government must now show that concealment was one of the
defendant’s ultimate purposes and not just an effect.
A. Courts Should Continue to Look At the Traditional Indicators of
Concealment
As previously discussed, traditional indicators of concealment include:
[S]tatements by a defendant probative of intent to conceal;
unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction; structuring the
transaction in a way to avoid attention; depositing illegal profits
in the bank account of a legitimate business; highly irregular
features of the transaction; using third parties to conceal the real
owner; a series of unusual financial moves cumulating in the
transaction; or expert testimony on practices of criminals.229
Money laundering case law is an area where there is not a lot of uniformity.
225. Id. at 27-28.
226. Id. at 35.
227. Id.
228. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
229. United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1994)
(footnotes omitted).

ARTICLE 6 (WANG) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

YES, THAT IS MONEY LAUNDERING

1/7/16 3:02 PM

287

Yet courts agree that these situations are ones where there is a strong
indication of intent to conceal. Courts need to take advantage of uniformity
where they can get it. I am not suggesting that if a specific fact pattern fits
into one of these categories there should be a presumption of concealment.
However, it should definitely be a factor that carries weight in the ultimate
deliberation. Using this as a starting point also should not raise concerns
about blanket applications of guilt or innocence. Money laundering cases
tend to be very fact-specific given the clever schemes that conspirators
attempt to develop. Because of this characteristic of money laundering
cases, courts will still inevitably have to analyze the specific circumstances
in fine detail before turning to the backdrop of case law.
B. Courts Ought to Allow Circumstantial Evidence to Show Intent As
Long As the Government Can Also Point to Concrete Evidence to
Support Its Claims
Some courts have been relatively generous regarding their definition
of intent by allowing juries to infer intent from circumstantial evidence.
This approach seems arbitrary. For example, in Rey, the Third Circuit
allowed the inference that the defendant wanted it to be difficult for the
investors to trace the funds to the companies in Hong Kong and wired the
money to those companies for the purpose of concealing the funds.230 This
type of inference asks courts to prod into multiple layers of a defendant’s
mind without concrete evidence. It is understandably difficult to prove
subjective intent. However, Cuellar specifically tells courts that it is not
whether an act conceals that matters, but it is the intent of the defendant
that is most significant.231 Indeed, the facts in Rey do not appear any
stronger than the facts in Ness, which the Second Circuit held failed the
Cuellar standard.232 In Ness, the court found that the defendant avoiding a
paper trail, hiding the proceeds in packages of jewelry, and using code
words was only enough to show the “how,” but not the “why.”233 Yet,
wiring funds abroad is apparently enough to show a design to conceal in
the Third Circuit.234
A more ideal approach would be one where a court looks at the
affirmative steps that a defendant took to conceal his or her proceeds.235
230. United States v. Rey, 595 F. App’x 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2014).
231. Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 566 (2008).
232. United States v. Ness, 565 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2009).
233. Id.
234. United States v. Rey, 595 F. App’x 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2014).
235. See United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1177 (11th Cir. 2005) (examining
several unusual things the defendant did in order to conceal the cash flow from his drug
proceeds to his lawyers, which thus supported a conviction of money laundering under 18
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The use of affirmative steps would be an objective way to assess a
subjective criterion. While some circumstantial evidence is stronger than
others, by allowing juries or judges to infer purposefulness from indirect
evidence, courts are not staying true to the Supreme Court’s mandate in
Cuellar. Justice Alito suggested in his Cuellar concurrence that the
government can show inferred intent through evidence that a specific
action can have a concealing effect and that the defendant knew the action
would have this type of effect.236 I agree with Justice Alito and provide a
similar recommendation. If an action is objectively known to have
concealing effects, the reliance on circumstantial evidence becomes more
concrete. As previously discussed, money laundering cases tend to be very
fact specific, thus making it difficult to develop one uniform standard.
However, by allowing this combination of circumstantial evidence and
objectively known effects, courts would have a benchmark that allows for
less subjective decisions and can be applied to a wide array of fact patterns.
Consider the following hypothetical set of facts. The defendant is a
drug dealer who had a habit of hiring people to collect drug proceeds on his
behalf and then had them deposit the proceeds in a bank account under the
name of a company not associated with the drug dealer. This behavior is
obviously objectively suspicious, but this evidence alone would not satisfy
the Cuellar standard of showing the “why” and not just the “how.”
However, the government then calls a witness, who happens to also be a
reformed drug dealer, to testify that it is common practice for drug dealers
to hire someone else to pick up drug sale proceeds and then deposit them in
an unassociated account for the purposes of concealing the funds. This
would seem to satisfy Justice Alito’s request for more specific evidence of
inferred intent. Not only is the behavior indicative of concealment, but in
this case, the government would have pointed to specific evidence that
would help a trier of fact infer that the defendant knew his actions would
conceal the illicit proceeds.
C. Courts Need to Follow Cuellar More Strictly
In many ways, Cuellar imposes a heavy burden for prosecutors to
meet. Apart from a defendant saying that they were trying to “conceal the
nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the illicit proceeds,”237
how realistic is it that the government can point to evidence in the record
that conclusively demonstrates intent to conceal? Justice Alito in Cuellar
would allow the use of circumstantial evidence, but his opinion was a
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)).
236. Cuellar, 553 U.S. at 569.
237. United States v. Mercedes, 283 F. App’x 862, 863-64 (2d Cir. 2008).
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concurrence and also dicta. Nonetheless, despite Cuellar’s shortcomings, it
is still necessary for lower courts to follow its mandate to focus on the
“why” of a defendant’s actions and not just the “how.”
The Supreme Court is still supreme and stare decisis requires that
Cuellar continue to be followed. Money laundering has an international
reach and impacts the economy at the national level.238 We do not want
different circuit courts applying different standards for a plethora of
reasons. For one, money laundering cases should turn on the facts of each
scenario, not procedural nuances regarding where the case is tried. It is
also unfair to defendants that they could be acquitted in one state while
convicted in another when the Supreme Court has already set out a
standard under which the government failed to meet its burden. As long as
Cuellar remains good law, lower courts need to follow it until another case
comes along.
Furthermore, Cuellar provides a check in preventing the money
laundering statute from becoming a money spending statute. The standard
becomes more difficult to apply in more complicated transactions with
multiple intermediate steps. For example, the Eighth Circuit found
sufficient design to conceal in Norman when the defendant bought a Range
Rover in his business’s name.239 While this decision is problematic
because it infers intent from spending illicit proceeds, the Eighth Circuit’s
reasoning that the defendant bought the car in order to make it more
difficult for the true owner of the money to trace what had happened to it
does point to specific steps that the defendant took in order to conceal or
disguise the location of the money. As discussed previously, purchasing
goods with illegal funds is not chargeable under the money laundering
statute, but if that purchase was made for the purposes of concealing those
funds, then there would be a valid case for concealment money laundering.
This can be seen in Garcia-Emanuel, where virtually every purchase was
deemed insufficient to convict the defendant for concealment money
laundering except for those goods that he put in his wife’s name to deceive
the IRS.240 The question that remains is how to weigh the purchase against
the intermediate steps in determining whether there was sufficient design to
conceal. There must be some limit or the courts risk turning the statute into
a money spending statute, which Congress has explicitly rejected. Courts

238. For an overview of the International Monetary Fund’s fight against money
laundering, see generally The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the
Financing
of
Terrorism,
INT’L
MONETARY
FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/aml.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/SXP4-X2L6.
239. United States v. Norman, 143 F.3d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1998).
240. United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1476-78 (10th Cir. 1994).
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ought to follow the Tenth Circuit’s approach in Garcia-Emanuel and only
find design to conceal when there is concrete evidence to support that
proposition. Taking affirmative steps to transform funds into a different
form is absolutely circumstantial evidence of a design to conceal. It would
be difficult for any defendant to argue that moving funds between multiple
bank accounts before ultimately purchasing a house would be for any other
purpose other than to conceal the source, location, or ownership of those
funds. For example, Magluta would probably still be decided the same
way today because funneling money through so many channels to pay
attorney fees would appear more than objectively suspicious.241 Why
would an individual go through so many people, countries, and bank
accounts to pay his attorney fees when he could just write and mail a check
himself? Even if he was not trying to conceal illicit funds, the facts make it
seem pretty obvious that the defendant in Magluta was concealing
something. It was not the spending of tainted funds, here to pay attorney
fees, that was problematic but how that money reached the attorney that
raised eyebrows.
However, when the circumstantial evidence of concealment is
comprised solely of a defendant’s purchases, those actions appear to fall
outside the scope of the statute. The government could always try to get
around this requirement by charging a defendant with promotion or
conspiracy to money launder instead since concealment money laundering
is not the only money laundering charge. Therefore, prosecutors may be
better off charging as many different types of money laundering as the facts
allow so that they do not remain pigeonholed to the strict standards for
concealment charges.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There are certain acts, such as using third parties to conceal the real
owner of funds or assets, which are traditionally associated with “classic”
concealment money laundering. However, many examples that courts
point to as evidence of a purpose to conceal are only that—evidence. This
can be seen by the jurisdictional differences in how courts have addressed
this issue with respect to cases in which the defendant placed funds or car
titles in another’s name. The Cuellar decision did not change the red flags
that alert courts to concealment money laundering, but it has concentrated
the focus on the subjective intent of the defendant rather than whether an
act could have the potential to conceal. This standard still leaves a good
deal of discretion for courts to determine whether a defendant acted with

241. United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005).
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the requisite purpose. It also has not unfairly altered the burden of proof
that the government must prove in order to obtain money laundering
convictions. Thus, Cuellar has not really changed the money laundering
game. It has not even really changed the rules. What Cuellar has changed
is the objective of proof at trial, and lower courts need to recognize this
rather than continue to follow their own whims. Courts may continue to
search for the traditional indicators of concealment money laundering but
they ought to point to the most concrete evidence and follow Cuellar’s
mandate more strictly.

